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Note
The Right to Counsel
And the Strict Waiver Standard
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost fifty years ago Justice Brandeis in a dissenting opinion
stated that
[i]f the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private crim-
inal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doc-
trine this Court should resolutely set its face.'
However, it is also appropriate to recall the words of Justice
Cardozo and the serious effect of allowing "the criminal .. .to go
free because the constable has blundered." 2 These opposing views
characterize the dilemma inherent in a system based upon a govern-
ment of laws. If the government itself does not observe the law
then the protections afforded each individual are jeopardized. Al-
ternatively, when there is no question as to the guilt of the accused
and yet he is allowed to go free, society begins to question the effec-
tiveness of the legal system. It is essential, then, that a govern-
ment of laws does not become a government of men, but the line
between the two is not easily drawn and represents a dilemma with
which the legal system has had to deal continually.
That this dilemma is still a source of disagreement is evidenced
in the case of Brewer v. Williams.3 Brewer required the United
States Supreme Court to determine if indeed the government had
become a lawbreaker, or more specifically, whether the police had
deprived Williams of his constitutional right to counsel. The emo-
tional aspects of the case were obvious, for if Williams had been
denied his right to counsel and had not waived that right he would
1. Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
2. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
3. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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probably go free.4 If not, his conviction for the brutal murder of
a ten-year-old girl would be affirmed. In a five to four decision
delivered by Mr. Justice Stewart,5 the Supreme Court held that
Williams was deprived of his right to counsel and that he had not
waived that right.0 This note will examine the Court's resolution
of the issues before it and will explore the shortcomings of the
decision in light of the Court's failure to enunciate a clearer
standard of waiver.
II. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
On December 24, 1968, a ten-year-old girl went with her family
to a wrestling tournament at the YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa.
After she failed to return from a trip to the washroom, a search
began but was unsuccessful.
Shortly after the girl disappeared, Robert Williams, a recent es-
capee from a mental hospital, was seen in the lobby of the YMCA
carrying a large bundle. A young boy helped Williams open the
door of his car, which was parked outside the door of the YMCA,
and Williams placed the bundle in his car. The boy stated that
4. "[T]he decision today probably means that, as a practical matter, no
new trial will be possible at this date eight years after the crime, and
that this respondent necessarily will go free." Id. at 441 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). However, Williams was found guilty of murder in the
first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment. State v. Wil-
liams, Doc. 94, No. 55805 (Polk County Iowa Dist. Ct. July 15, 1977).
5. Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined in the opinion.
6. It would appear that the majority held fast to the view expressed by
Justice Brandeis by determining that protection of an individual's con-
stitutional rights is to be valued over securing the conviction of a crim-
inal by illegal means. The dissenting justices strongly disagreed and
characterized the decision as punishing the public since the police were
not guilty of any unconstitutional misconduct. Particularly, Mr. Chief
Justice Burger criticized the majority for excluding Williams' dis-
closures from the fact-finding process since the only valid justification
for excluding reliable evidence is to deter unlawful police conduct.
The Chief Justice insisted that a balancing approach should have been
used wherein the court would "consider whether the benefits secured
by application of the exclusionary rule in this case outweigh its ob-
vious social costs." 430 U.S. at 422. Under this approach one would
consider the seriousness of the police misconduct and weigh it against
the strong interest of effective prosecution of criminals. Chief Justice
Burger found that the balancing method was possible in Brewer "be-
cause Williams' incriminating disclosures [were] not infected with
any element of compulsion the Fifth Amendment forbids; nor. . . does
this evidence pose any danger of unreliability to the factfinding proc-
ess." Id. at 424. However, the Chief Justice's analysis points out
the weaknesses of the balancing approach since the result largely de-
pends on what particular interests are balanced against each other.
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he "saw two legs in it and they were skinny and white."'7 Williams
then drove away. His abandoned car was found in Davenport,
Iowa, and a warrant was then issued in Des Moines for his arrest.
It is ironic, although not unusual, that the determination of
a constitutional question should depend on a majority of the jus-
tices viewing the facts in a similar manner. As Mr. Justice Powell
stated in his concurring opinion, "resolution of the issues in this
case turns primarily on one's perception of the facts."8 Accord-
ingly, what happened on December 26 is crucial to an understanding
of the decision in Brewer.
On the morning of December 26, Henry McKnight, a Des Moines
attorney, informed the Des Moines police that he had received a
call from Williams and had advised him to surrender to police in
Davenport. Williams did so and the Davenport police booked him
and gave him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona.9 Wil-
liams and McKnight then conversed on the telephone and in the
presence of the Des Moines Chief of Police and Detective Learning,
McKnight explained to Williams that Des Moines police officers
would pick him up in Davenport, that they would not interrogate
him, and that he was not to talk to the officers about the girl until
he had consulted with McKnight. As a result, McKnight reached
an agreement with the police that they would bring Williams
directly back to Des Moines and would not question him during
the trip.
In Davenport, Williams had been arraigned before a judge who
had advised him of his Miranda rights. In the courtroom, Williams
had conferred with a lawyer named Kelly. The two then met with
Detective Leaning and a fellow officer and Williams was again
advised of his Miranda rights. Kelly then reiterated that there was
to be no interrogation of Williams during the trip to Des Moines.
Additionally, Kelly asked Learning that he be permitted to ride
along in the police car to Des Moines, but this request was refused.
During the 160-mile ride to Des Moines, Williams and Learning
Obviously, the majority would not have reached the Chief Justice's
result because they would have balanced Williams' constitutional right
to counsel against the need to secure convictions of criminals. There-
fore, the Chief Justice's suggestion of employing a balancing approach
is neither desirable nor feasible and would probably lead to chaos
similar to that already existing in the first amendment area. An ap-
proach which depends on balancing away constitutional rights is a
repugnant solution.
7. Id. at 390.
8. Id. at 409.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that the suspect be informed
that he may remain silent, that if he gives up that right anything he
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engaged in a conversation in which Williams stated several times
that "[w] hen I get to Des Moines and see Mr. McKnight, I am going
to tell you the whole story."10 Shortly after leaving Davenport,
Detective Leaming gave his "Christian burial speech."
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling
down the road .... Number one, I want you to observe the
weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving
is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early
this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for to-
night, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows
where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have only been
there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be
unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area
on the way to Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the
body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a
Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from
them on Christmas Eve and murdered. And I feel we should stop
and locate it on the way rather than waiting until morning and
trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being
able to find it at all."
At a point fifteen miles from Des Moines, Williams stated he would
show the officers where they could find the body. He then directed
them to the location.
Williams was indicted for first-degree murder. His attorney
moved to suppress all evidence relating to the statements Williams
made during the trip, but the trial court denied the motion and
the evidence was introduced at trial. The jury found Williams
guilty of murder and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tion.' 2 Williams then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The
district court held that the evidence in question had been wrongly
says can be used against him in court, that he has the right to coun-
sel, and that if he is not financially able to hire an attorney, the court
will appoint one.
10. 430 U.S. at 390.
11. Id. at 392-93.
12. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1970). The majority of the
Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Williams had
"waived his right to the presence of his counsel" on the automobile ride
from Davenport to Des Moines. Id. at 402. The dissenting justices
expressed the view that
when counsel and police have agreed defendant is not to be
questioned until counsel is present and defendant has been ad-
vised not to talk and repeatedly has stated he will tell the
whole story after he talks with counsel, the state should be
required to make a stronger showing of intentional voluntary
waiver than was made here.
Id. at 408.
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admitted at trial on the ground that Williams had been denied his
constitutional right to counsel and further ruled that he had not
waived that right.13 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.
1 4
III. THE ISSUES
The district court based its conclusion on three independent
grounds: (1) Williams had been denied his constitutional right to
counsel; (2) he had been denied his constitutional protections as
defined in Escobedo v. Illinois5 and Miranda v. Arizona'" and (3)
his self-incriminating statements during the trip from Davenport
to Des Moines had been made involuntarily. The Supreme Court,
however, determined that it need only review the question of
whether Williams was deprived of his constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel 17 as guaranteed by the sixth' s and fourteenth
amendments. 9
A. The Right to Counsel During Interrogation
The contours of the sixth amendment right had been well es-
tablished in earlier decisions by the Supreme Court.2 0 It had been
defined as entitling a person to the help of a lawyer at or after
13. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (Williams' in-
criminating statements obtained in violation of his right to counsel and
privilege against self-incrimination, and not voluntarily made).
14. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974). Williams' privilege
against self-incrimination and right to assistance of counsel during in-
terrogation were violated when police engaged in conversation with
him and by "a subtle form of interrogation" obtained incriminating
statements and evidence from him. Id. at 234.
15. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (accused in a criminal prosecution may be entitled
to counsel prior to indictment).
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. The Court had been urged by several states as amici curiae to over-
rule the procedural ruling in Miranda. However, it was apparent that
the Court did not want to undertake the massive task of reexamining
Miranda on the facts presented in Brewer. But because the Court has
had such a difficult time in developing a standard for waiver, and be-
cause the decision in Brewer did not clear up the confusion, it is likely
that the Miranda decision will be closely scrutinized in the future. Cf.
Note, The Right to Counsel: An Alternative to Miranda, 38 La. L. Rev.
239 (1977) (the Court may prefer to "sidestep" the issue of overruling
Miranda by basing decisions on the sixth amendment).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his de-
fense." Id.
19. The sixth amendment had been applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade,
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the time that judicial proceedings had been initiated against him
"whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment." 2' 1 In Brewer, the Court found that
several factors indicated that judicial proceedings had been initiated
before the trip from Davenport to Des Moines: (1) an arrest war-
ant had been issued; (2) Williams had been arraigned on that
warrant; and (3) he had been committed to jail. Thus, under Kirby
v. Ilinois22 it was clear that Williams was entitled to the assistance
of counsel during the trip from Davenport to Des Moines.
23
The Court went on to find that the doctrine of Massiah v. United
States24 was also applicable in determining Williams' right to coun-
sel. As explained by the Court, "the clear rule of Massiah is that
once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual,
he has a right to legal representation when the government interro-
gates him."25 The Court then found itself thrust into the maze
of defining "interrogation" in an attempt to answer the argument
that Detective Leaming's "Christian burial speech" did not amount
to interrogation. 2
6
388 U.S. 218 (1967); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
21. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
22. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
23. See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (pretrial event
"critical stage" at which accused has a right to counsel when aid re-
quired in coping with legal problems or in meeting adversary in con-
frontation).
24. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah, the defendant had been indicted and
was represented by counsel. In order to obtain incriminating state-
ments from the defendant, the police arranged for an alleged accom-
plice of the defendant to meet with the defendant in the accomplice's
car. The car was equipped with a radio transmitter which enabled
a government agent to hear incriminating statements made by the de-
fendant to the alleged accomplice; these statements were introduced
at trial over the defendant's objections. The Supreme Court held
that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that
guarantee [the right to counsel] when there was used against
him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words,
which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after
he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.
Id. at 206.
25. 430 U.S. at 401.
26. This argument stemmed from Detective Leaming's testimony in the
state court record, see 182 N.W.2d at 403 and note 27 infra, and was
adopted by the dissenting justices, see note 45 infra. It appears that
Justice Stewart was attempting to convince the dissent that the speech
had to be interrogation since all the justices agreed that Williams
was entitled to counsel. 430 U.S. at 400.
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The majority reasoned that Detective Learning deliberately set
out to elicit information from Williams just as effectively as if there
had been a formal interrogation. Leaming knew that Williams was
represented by counsel but purposely sought to obtain as much in-
criminating information as possible during Williams' isolation from
his lawyers.2 7 Finally, the Court noted that the speech must have
been "tantamount to interrogation" since the state courts recog-
nized that Williams was entitled to the assistance of counsel "[y] et
no such constitutional protection would have come into play if there
had been no interrogation." 2 This rationale is indeed perplexing
because on the surface it would appear to be nothing more than
a circular definitiori, i.e., Williams was entitled to the right to coun-
sel and, -therefore, the "speech" must have been interrogation; be-
cause it was interrogation, Williams was entitled to the guaranty
of the right to counsel. It is, therefore, not clear whether applica-
tion of the Massiah doctrine is anything more than superfluous. If
it were a settled constitutional doctrine under Kirby29 that prior
to the automobile trip and thereafter Williams had the right to as-
sistance of counsel, it should make no difference whether the
"Christian burial speech" was interrogation or not.
One plausible interpretation 30 is that the Court was stating
nothing more than "(i) Williams had the right to assistance of coun-
sel; (ii) once that right attached . . ,the State could not properly
27. Cross-examination of Detective Learning elicited the following testi-
mony during pre-trial proceedings in the Polk County District Court:
Q. Now, when you left, just before you left, do you remem-
ber we had parted greetings and didn't you say, "I'll go get
him and bring him right back here to Des Moines?" A. Yes,
sir.
Q. You said that to me, didn't you? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Knowing that you were dealing with a person from a
mental hospital, did you say to him, you don't have to tell
me this information, did you say that to him out there on the
highway? A. What information?
Q. The information that he gave you, the defendant gave
you, you didn't say that to him, did you? A. No, sir.
Q. In fact, Captain, whether he was a mental patient or not,
you were trying to get all the information you could before
he got to his lawyer, weren't you? A. I was sure hoping to
find out where that little girl was, yes, sir.
Q. Well, I'll put it this way: You were hoping to get all the
information you could before Williams got back to McKnight,
weren't you? A. Yes, sir.
375 F. Supp. at 174.
28. 430 U.S. at 400.
29. 406 U.S. 682. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
30. Further interpretations are discussed elsewhere in this note. See notes
47 and 48 and accompanying text infra.
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interrogate [him] in the absence of counsel unless he voluntarily
and knowingly waived the right. . . ."3 In this respect, the ques-
tion of interrogation becomes vitally important, not as a means of
determining whether Williams was entitled to counsel (as the
opinion misleadingly suggests), but as a means of determining
whether that right was violated. This notion is further supported
by the Court's conclusion that "[t] he circumstances of this case are
thus constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in
Massiah v. United States .... That the incriminating statements
were elicited surreptitiously in the Massiah case, and otherwise
here, is constitutionally irrelevant. '32  Although it was not clearly
stated, the Court appeared to hold that the "statements" by Detec-
tive Learning were as much interrogation as the methods used in
Massiah33 and that such interrogation is not constitutionally per-
missible in the absence of counsel unless the right is waived.3 4
However, difficulty still arises in determining what is constitu-
tionally impermissible interrogation as the decision fails to set out
definite criteria for making such a determination.3 5
31. 430 U.S. at 409-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 400.
33. See note 24 supra.
34. At least two circuit courts of appeal have found sixth amendment vio-
lations in similar situations in which government authorities have ig-
nored demands by counsel that interrogation take place only in their
presence. See Taylor v. Elliott, 458 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1972) (inter-
rogation in the face of officer's knowledge that defendant had counsel
who was absent but who had instructed him not to make any state-
ment violated defendant's sixth amendment rights); United States ex
rel. Magoon v. Reincke, 416 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1969) (defendant's con-
stitutional right violated when statements were obtained by interro-
gation in the absence of counsel after counsel had informed police that
the accused was not to be interrogated further). The Nebraska Su-
preme Court appears to be in accord. See State v. Johns, 185 Neb.
590, 177 N.W.2d 580 (1970).
35. It is doubtful that there is any validity to Justice Blackmun's concern
"that Massiah is violated whenever police engage in any conduct,
in the absence of counsel, with the subjective desire to obtain informa-
tion from a suspect after arraignment." 430 U.S. at 440. However, one
can only hypothesize as to what is and what is not interrogation: it
need not be in the form of a question, it might involve the use of psy-
chology, and it is used with the intent to produce incriminating re-
sponses. Under these criteria a variety of statements might be con-
sidered interrogation, but without further guidelines from the Supreme
Court the situation in Brewer might well be repeated in the future.
State courts such as those in Iowa could determine that certain state-
ments were tantamount to interrogation only to find the Supreme
Court holding that they were not.
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B. Waiver
Having found that Williams was entitled to the constitutional
right to counsel during interrogation, the Court then turned to con-
sider whether Williams had waived that right.
The Iowa Supreme Court, applying the totality-of-circumstances
test, had affirmed the trial court's determination that Williams had
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 36 The district court held
that the Iowa courts had applied the wrong constitutional stan-
dard3 7 and concluded that under the proper standard there was
simply no evidence to support a waiver.38 The court of appeals
approved the reasoning of the district court.39
The Supreme Court ruled that the district court and the court of
appeals were correct in their understanding of the proper standard
to be applied in determining the question of waiver.40 That stan-
dard imposes upon the state the burden of proving "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."4' 1
The fact that this strict standard applies to an alleged waiver of
36. The Iowa Supreme Court concluded:
[E]vidence of the time element involved on the trip, the gen-
eral circumstances of it, and the absence of any request or ex-
pressed desire for the aid of counsel before or at the time of
giving information, were sufficient to sustain a conclusion that
defendant did waive his constitutional rights as alleged.
182 N.W.2d at 402.
37. 375 F. Supp. at 182.
38. The court explained:
[I]t is the government which bears a heavy burden . . .but
that is the burden which explicitly was placed on [Williams]by the courts ....by [T here is no affirmative indication ... that [Wil-
liams] did waive his rights .... [Tihe state courts' em-
phasis on the absence of a demand for counsel was not only
legally inappropriate, but factually unsupportable as well,
since Detective Learning himself testified that [Williams]
would talk after he saw Mr. McKnight. Both these state-
ments and Mr. Kelly's statement to Detective Learning that[Williams] would talk only after seeing Mr. McKnight in
Des Moines certainly were assertions of [Williams'] "right or
desire not to give information absent the presence of his attor-
ney. . . ." Moreover, the statements were obtained only after
Detective Leaming's use of psychology on a person whom heknew to be deeply religious and an escapee from a mental
hospital-with the specific intent to elicit incriminating state-
ments. In the face of this evidence, the State has produced
no affirmative evidence whatsoever to support its claim of
waiver, and, a fortiori, it cannot be said that the State has met
its "heavy burden" of showing a knowing and intelligent
waiver of ... Sixth Amendment rights.
Id. at 182-83.
39. 509 F.2d at 233.
40. 430 U.S. at 402-04.
41. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pre-
trial proceedings had been firmly established in earlier Supreme
Court decisions.4
2
In applying this standard, the majority found that there was
no reasonable basis for concluding that Williams had waived his
right and concluded that the state had failed to meet its burden
of demonstrating a valid waiver. The Court offered several justifi-
cations for this holding. First, waiver requires relinquishment and
not merely comprehension-Williams' consistent reliance on the ad-
vice of counsel contradicted a suggestion that he had waived his
right. Second, his statements in the car that he would tell the
whole story after seeing McKnight were a clear expression of his
intent to have his lawyer present during interrogation. Third, by
having attorneys in both Davenport and Des Moines he had effec-
tively asserted his right to counsel. Finally, Williams knew of the
agreement that he was not to be interrogated and since he had con-
tinually relied on the advice of his counsel, there was no reason
to believe that he had changed that agreement.
However, Justice White in his dissent 43 argued that these facts
plainly showed that Williams had knowingly and intentionally re-
linquished his right to counsel. According to Justice White,
[r] espondent relinquished his right not to talk to the police about
his crime when the car approached the place where he had hid-
den the victim's clothes. Men usually intend to do what they do
and there is nothing in the record to support the proposition that
respondent's decision to talk was anything but an exercise of his
own free will. Apparently, without any prodding from the officers,
respondent-who had earlier said that he would tell the whole
story when he arrived in Des Moines-spontaneously changed his
mind about the timing of his disclosures when the car approached
the places where he had hidden the evidence.44
These contrasting views can be reconciled when one considers
the real source of disagreement. The majority had found that
Leaming's "Christian burial speech" amounted to interrogation
whereas the dissenting justices did not agree with that conclusion.45
42. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
43. 430 U.S. at 429. Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined the dissenting
opinion.
44. Id. at 434.
45. The dissenting justices appeared to take the view that Leaming's state-
ments were nothing more than conversation. When Williams decided
to reveal where he had hidden the body it was not because of any
coercive interrogation by Leaming. Rather it was a clear indication
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The underlying rationale appears to be that in the absence of inter-
rogation, Williams' incriminating statements and conduct, if made
on his own initiative, would have been a waiver of his right to
counsel.4
6
In this respect several other interpretations of the Massiah
doctrine are suggested. The majority would appear to be stating:
1. Massiah is merely an expansion of the contours of the sixth
amendment, namely that an accused has the right to counsel
when he is being interrogated; 47 or
2. During interrogation an accused cannot effectively waive
his right to counsel in the absence of that counsel;48 or
3. Absence of counsel during interrogation carries with it a pre-
sumption that there has been no valid waiver.
The difficulty lies in the fact that the decision is not clear as
to the effect the Massiah doctrine had in Brewer. The majority
simply indicated that the state had not met its burden of showing
waiver and did not further explain what the state failed to show.
The Court has thus left open the possibility that what it meant
that although he knew he had the right not to say anything in the
absence of counsel he had intentionally relinquished that right.
46. A question that lingers is whether Williams would have revealed the
body's location if Detective Learning had not given his "Christian
burial speech." It is interesting to note that during oral argument
Robert Bartels, counsel for Williams, explained that the "speech" was
the turning point for Williams since before that monologue he had
given little or no information. It was pointed out that "[t]he refer-
ence to a 'Christian burial' was obviously designed to play on Wil-
liams' strong religious feelings." [1976] 20 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 4033,
4034. This thesis is supported by John Rogge. He notes that one of the
reasons the communist inquisitors were so successful in their brain-
washing and interrogating techniques was that they focused on the
four factors of guilt feelings, inner rebellion, lack of love, and the
need for punishment. J. RoaGE, WHY MEN CoNFEss 209-22 (1959). It
could be said that Leaming's speech was designed to elicit guilt feelings
and a need for punishment especially in light of Williams' strong re-
ligious convictions. There was also further discussion of "what peo-
ple's opinion was of him," 182 N.W.2d at 407, indicating an appeal to
Williams' feelings of lack of love. Under Rogge's analysis this would
at the least be a form of subtle interrogation. Under these circum-
stances, the fact that statements were eventually obtained sheds fur-
ther doubt on the argument that Williams waived his right inten-
tionally.
47. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
48. This proposition is questionable since the Court specifically noted that
it did not hold that under the circumstances of this case Williams could
not, without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments. 430 U.S. at 405-06.
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was that the absence of counsel during interrogation is subject to
the presumption that the accused did not validly waive his sixth
amendment right.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Brewer the Supreme Court reaffirmed the notion that the
government may not use unlawful means to secure the conviction
of a criminal. In holding that Williams' right to counsel was vio-
lated by Detective Leaming's interrogation, the Court failed to de-
fine with any certainty what is and what is not interrogation.
There is an indication that it involves more than a subjective intent
to obtain information, but until a more specific test is announced
the likelihood of any consistency on this determination will be
remote.
The question of what satisfies the strict waiver standard is also
unanswered. The Court held that the state had failed to sustain
its burden of showing waiver. But without further guidelines, one
is left to speculate that if counsel is not present during interrogation
it will be difficult if not impossible to prove that an accused waived
his sixth amendment right.
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